The Impact of PSPF Direction 002-2026: What Government Agencies Need to Know

Tal Nathan
Regional CTO, ANZ
6 min read

On 29 September 2026, the Secretary of the Department of Home Affairs in Australia issued PSPF Direction 002-2026. It instructs every non-corporate Commonwealth entity to identify its legacy technology, develop a risk management plan and report both to Home Affairs by 31 March 2027. Although the direction’s full title refers to AI-enabled risks, the requirements focus on mature technology.

The direction calls for a stocktake and risk management plan, not a blanket replacement programme. It requires Australian government agencies to address risks associated with existing, mature systems that remain operational, while setting risk-based targets for reducing legacy technology.

In this article, Australian government IT leaders will learn:

  • What the direction actually requires
  • What qualifies as legacy technology
  • How this new directive aligns with existing Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) guidance
  • How to assess systems that may need to remain in operation

PSPF Direction 002-2026 at a glance

Here is a brief overview of the PSPF Direction 002-2026 — Commonwealth Cyber Posture Against Al-Enabled Risks:

  • The Secretary of the Department of Home Affairs issued PSPF Direction 002-2026 on 29 September, 2026, under the Protective Security Policy Framework.
  • The direction applies to non-corporate Commonwealth entities.
  • Every impacted entity must complete a Legacy Technology Stocktake, develop a Legacy Technology Risk Management Plan and report both to Home Affairs by 31 March 2027.
  • Entities operating Systems of Government Significance (SoGS) must apply the SoGS Risk Reduction Measures and report their stocktake of those systems by 31 December 2026.

In short, the obligation is to find every legacy system, set a reduction target commensurate with the entity’s risk tolerance and appetite, protect what remains in operation and meet the applicable reporting deadlines.

What is PSPF Direction 002-2026?

PSPF Direction 002-2026 is a mandatory direction requiring every non-corporate Commonwealth entity to complete a Legacy Technology Stocktake, develop a Legacy Technology Risk Management Plan and report both by 31 March 2027, with earlier action for SoGS. Read the direction.

The direction is intended to help reduce cyber risk from vulnerable legacy systems while mitigating the risks posed by systems that remain. Moreover, it converts earlier guidance into a dated obligation for accountable authorities.

Home Affairs had previously published Policy Advisory 001-2026, concerning cyber security readiness in the frontier AI era, on 27 May 2026. Read the policy advisory.

This is the third in a sequence of stocktake-style PSPF directions. Direction 002-2024 covered internet-facing systems, while Direction 001-2026 covered Cisco SD-WAN systems. Entities that completed the 2024 technology asset stocktake should therefore already have a starting inventory for this work.

Does PSPF Direction 002-2026 apply to every entity?

PSPF Direction 002-2026 applies to every non-corporate Commonwealth entity — of which there are about 102, according to the Commonwealth Cyber Security Posture in 2025. ASD’s 2025 posture report covered 101. That includes departments and agencies under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act. The accountable authority, usually the Secretary or agency head, is answerable for adherence.

Several scope considerations are particularly important:What happens if an entity misses the deadline?

  • Entities operating an SoGS have an earlier deadline of 31 December 2026.
  • Systems managed by contractors or managed service providers are in scope because the direction covers systems “managed by, or on behalf of, the entity”.
  • Corporate Commonwealth entities, Commonwealth companies and state or territory agencies are not bound by the direction.

The available exemption is limited to reporting for a legitimate business reason associated with national security functions. However, it doesn’t remove the obligation to complete the stocktake or maintain the plan.

What does PSPF Direction 002-2026 require, and by when?

The direction establishes four principal requirements across two deadlines:

  1. Complete a Legacy Technology Stocktake by 31 March 2027. Identify legacy technology managed by or on behalf of the entity, prioritising public-facing services.
  2. Develop and maintain a Legacy Technology Risk Management Plan by 31 March 2027. Incorporate it into the entity’s cybersecurity strategy and uplift plan. It must include a target to reduce legacy systems “commensurate with the entity’s risk tolerance and appetite”, prioritisation strategies, mitigations for systems that remain and procedures to rationalise the technology estate.
  3. Report by 31 March 2027. Confirm completion of the stocktake and provide the plan to the Commonwealth Security Policy Branch at Home Affairs.
  4. Address SoGS by 31 December 2026. Apply relevant risk-reduction measures and report the SoGS stocktake.

The direction also calls on entities to balance system availability with security, strengthening vulnerability and patch management across the estate, particularly for public-facing systems.

What happens if an entity misses the deadline?

The direction doesn’t specify a financial penalty or fine for missing the deadline. Instead, entities confirm compliance with each direction in their annual PSPF report or provide an explanation of non-compliance. The accountable authority approves that report before it goes to the minister and Home Affairs, and the information feeds into the published PSPF Assessment Report.

Home Affairs can quality check the submission, and the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) can audit it. If a system that should have been identified on the stocktake is later breached, the direction serves as documented evidence that the entity was expected to identify it.

What counts as legacy technology under the PSPF?

Under the PSPF, a system qualifies as legacy when it meets at least one criterion from both Category A (the vendor test) and Category B, (the entity test).

Category A: The vendor test

  • The product has reached end-of-life status.
  • The product is out of vendor support.
  • The product is on extended support from its manufacturer, vendor or developer.

Category B: The entity test

  • The product is impractical to update or support in-house.
  • The product is no longer cost-effective.
  • The product is above the entity’s acceptable risk threshold.
  • The product offers diminishing business utility.
  • The product obstructs the entity’s IT strategies.

Both categories must be met.

The four examples below show how the test works:

  • An Oracle database is no longer supported by the vendor, but it remains affordable, useful and patched through third-party support. Category A is met, but Category B isn’t. Under this test, it’s not considered legacy.
  • A supported product is blocking the IT strategy and costing more than it returns. Category B is met, but Category A is n’t. Under this test, it’s not considered legacy, regardless of age.
  • An unsupported application ’t be supported, costs more than the entity can justify and holds citizen data. Both categories are met, so it’s considered legacy and should be prioritised in the entity’s risk management plan.
  • A grey-zone case is an SAP ECC system on paid extended support, at several times the standard fee, which the organization says it can’t operate without. Category A is met because extended support counts, but whether Category B is met depends on whether the arrangement remains cost-effective or if alternative third-party support can be sourced.

The important point is that age or vendor lifecycle status alone doesn’t make a system legacy. An entity must also assess the technology against its own cost, risk, business utility or strategic criteria.

How does the direction fit with the Essential Eight and the ISM?

PSPF Direction 002-2026 applies existing ASD control frameworks rather than creating a new technical set. The Essential Eight and Information Security Manual (ISM) remain the relevant references for patching and/or compensating controls and accepted residual risk.

The Essential Eight connection

The “patch applications” and “patch operating systems” strategies set tight windows for fixing critical vulnerabilities and require unsupported applications and operating systems to be removed. Where legacy technology is sustained, the PSPF Direction requires entities to identify and mitigate the resulting risks. Those mitigations may include appropriate compensating controls and third-party support, subject to the entity’s risk assessment. The stocktake provides evidence that the entity knows which systems fall under this category.

The ISM connection

Where a system can’t meet cyber security requirements, the ISM expects compensating controls, enhanced monitoring and assurance activities to maintain an acceptable level of residual risk until the system can be decommissioned or replaced. The system’s controls and security risks must be documented through the ISM risk -management and authorisation process, with the authorising officer deciding whether to accept the risks associated with its continued operation.

That is consistent with what the PSPF Direction calls “mitigations to address risks arising from continued sustainment”. These system-level assessments and authorisations can form the evidence base for the portfolio-level plan.

The strategy connection

“Incorporated into the entity’s cyber security strategy and uplift plan” means the legacy plan becomes part of the existing plan rather than a separate document. Entities report Essential Eight maturity every year. A legacy plan with named systems, named controls and a signed reduction target gives that report something concrete to point to.

What should an entity do first?

Australian Government IT leaders should start with the evidence they already have.

Update the 2024 technology asset stocktake and add the vendor’s end-of- support date to every line. This completes the first pass of the Category A test and shows the scale of the task before detailed planning begins.

Key takeaways

PSPF Direction 002-2026 requires non-corporate Commonwealth entities to complete a legacy technology stocktake, develop a risk management plan and report both to Home Affairs by 31 March 2027, with an earlier deadline for SoGS. However, IT leaders should keep in mind that legacy status requires more than a vendor lifecycle milestone; a comprehensive assessment should also consider the entity’s risk, cost, utility and strategic criteria. Most importantly, the direction calls for agencies to understand their technology estate, address identified risks and plan deliberately for technology that continues to operate. For a practical look at conducting the stocktake, building the risk management plan and documenting controls for systems that remain in operation, read the second part of this blog series here.

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FAQs

Does PSPF Direction 002-2026 apply to state government agencies?

No. PSPF Direction 002-2026 only applies to non-corporate Commonwealth entities. State and territory agencies are outside its direct scope.

What is a System of Government Significance (SoGS)?

A SoGS is a Commonwealth-declared system subject to additional security requirements. Entities operating a declared SoGS are subject to the 31 December, 2026 deadline under this direction.

Is every unsupported system automatically legacy?

No. Under the PSPF test, a system must meet at least one Category A criterion and at least one Category B criterion. Unsupported status alone satisfies the vendor side of the test but doesn’t, by itself, complete the assessment.

About the author

About the author

Tal Nathan

Regional CTO, ANZ